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IN T!IE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
LITTLE AMERICA REFINING 
COMPANY, 
vs. 
Plaintiff-
Appellant, 
CASE NO. 17331 
JESSE ALBERT LEYBA, 
Defendant, and 
SVEN HEIMBERG, 
Defendant-
Respondent. 
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action for property damage arising out of a 
collision with plaintiff's service station by a vehicle driven 
by defendant Sven Heimberg, following a collision between the 
Heimberg vehicle and a vehicle driven by defendant Jesse Albert 
Leyba. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury. From a directed verdict 
and judgment for defendant Heimberg at the close of plaintiff's 
evidence, plaintiff appeals. Default judgment was entered against 
defendant Leyba for failure to appear or answer plaintiff's 
Complaint. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the directed verdict u 
favor of defendant Heimberg, and a new trial on the issues in 
this case. Defendant Leyba is not a party to this appeal, 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Yelling and Throwing Firecrackers 
At approximately 1:00 a.m. on April 2, 1979, the ind: 
vidual defendants were each driving pickup trucks northbow.d 
South State Street in Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County (T. L 
121). Occupants of the vehicle driven by defendant Leyba 
(hereinafter referred to as the "Leyba vehicle") yelled at 
the occupants of the vehicle driven by defendant Heimberg 
(hereinafter referred to as the "Heimberg vehicle") and rewe: 
their engine as if they wanted to race (T. 123). 
Near North Temple Street a passenger in the Heimberq 
vehicle threw firecrackers at the Leyba vehicle (T. 145). 
B. Race by Leyba Vehicle 
The Leyba vehicle then accelerated up the hill north· 
bound on State Street to Third North Street in Salt Lake citv, 
followed by the Heimberg vehicle (T. 146). The Leyba vehicle 
turned right. The Heimberg vehicle turned left and drove 
towards Columbia Street (T. 146). 
C. Fight by Capitol Building 
The Leyba vehicle then turned around and passed the 
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Reimberq vehicle at about the corner of Columbia Street (Main 
Street) and Third North Street. The Leyba vehicle turned north 
on Columbia Street and stopped in the middle of the street. 
Defendant Heimberg stopped his vehicle behind the Leyba vehicle 
(T. 14 7). 
Passengers of the Leyba vehicle got out, came back to 
the Heimberg vehicle and started "bad-mouthing" its occupants 
(T. 147). After a further exchange of words, a fight broke out 
between a passenger of each vehicle (T. 147, 148). The passenger 
from the Heimberg vehicle, a James Harris, hit and knocked down 
a passenger from the Leyba vehicle, and kicked him while he lay 
on the ground (T. 148). 
D. Race Down Victory Road 
Mr. Harris qot back into the Heimberg vehicle, and 
defendant Heimberg started up his truck and drove around the 
Leyba vehicle down Victory Road towards Beck Street (T. 148, 149). 
The Leyba vehicle followed the Heimberg vehicle at a 
high rate of speed (T. 149). Although Heimberg gave self-
serving testimony that he was not trying to get away from Leyba 
(T. 153), witnesses testified that the two vehicles drove down 
Victory Road at a rate of speed much faster than other cars 
coming down Victory Road (T. 101). Witnesses also testified 
that the two vehicles appeared to be racing (T. 96, 100) • and 
that the engine sounds of the two vehicles driven by the respective 
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defendants just prior to their collision was louder than ::h, 
engine sounds of other vehicles (T. 94). 
E. Collision 
The two vehicles collided at or near the intersectl: 
of Beck Street and Victory Road (T. 149, 150). The Heimbe~? 
vehicle crashed through plaintiff's gasoline station, knoct~ 
over several gasoline pumps and light poles and starting a fr 
which damaged plaintiff's gasoline station, and caused lost 
profits. The total damages equal $20,594.17 (T. 107, 113, L 
150 t 163) • 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. The trial court erred in re fusing to allow test: 
mony concerning the speed of the defendants' vehicles at the 
time of the collision between the two vehicles. 
2. The evidence is sufficient to support a finding 
that defendant-respondent Heimberg was negligent. 
3. The evidence is sufficient to support a finding 
that defendant-respondent Heimberg' s negligence was the prox:· 
mate cause of plaintiff-appellant's damages. 
4. The trial court in granting a directed verdict: 
defendant-respondent Heimberg improperly refused to submit t:· 
issue of his negligence to the jury. 
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ARGUMENT 
Point 1. The trial court erred in refusing to allow 
testimony concerning the speed of defendants' vehicles at the 
time of the collision between the two vehicles. 
The trial court should have allowed the testimony of 
Barry Bell with respect to the speed the two pickup trucks driven 
by defendants were traveling at the time of the collision between 
the two vehicles. Mr. Bell observed the vehicles for a few 
seconds prior to their collision and actually saw them collide 
(T. 94). He heard the loud engine noises (T. 94), and he was 
only approximately 75 yards from the point of impact (T. 95). 
~1r. Bell has observed, in his words, "millions" of cars driving 
down Victory Road (T. 95), knows approximately how fast cars are 
traveling as they drive down Victory Road (T. 96), and knows that 
the posted speed limit is 50 miles per hour at that location 
(T. 95). He testified that the trucks looked like they were 
racing (T. 96). 
The general rule accepted by jurisdictions which have 
examined this issue is that any person of ordinary intelligence, 
who has an opportunity for observation, is competent to testify 
as to the rate of speed of a moving vehicle. This rule was 
followed by the court of Appeals of Arizona in T~•nsend vs. 
Whatton, 21 Ariz. App. 556, 521 P.2d 1014 (1974), an action 
for injuries and property damage sustained when plaintiff's car 
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was struck by defendant's car after the plaintiff driver tur: 
onto the road in front of the defendant's car. The trial cc. 
refused to allow plaintiff's witness to testify that the de'.; 
dant was drag racing just prior to the accident, and plainti: 
claimed error. The Court of Appeals did not agree with the: 
court and said: 
A non-expert witness, where qualified 
by sufficient experience, may qive an 
opinion as to the speed of a vehicle 
if there has been a reasonable oppor-
tunity to observe it. Even a non-
driver may be sufficiently qualified 
to give an estimate of speed. 521 
P.2d at 1016; citations omitted. 
The Townsend court went on to hold that non-expert testimon7 
that the defendant was driving in excess of a reasonable and 
prudent speed was inadmissible, but that the estimate of spe; 
"should be couched in terms of miles per hour, fast or slow, 
etc. 521 P.2d at 1016. The case was reversed and ff 
to the trial court for a new trial. 
In the matter of Potts vs. Brown, 452 P.2d 975 (Wye. 
19 69), the Supreme Court affirmed a jury verdict for plainti' 
The Potts case was an action for personal injuries sustained 
when vehicles driven by plaintiff and defendant collided at' 
uncontrolled, ninety-degree intersection. Witnesses, inclui. 
two minor children, were allowed to testify over the objecti: 
of the defendant as to the speed of the vehicles involved, '' 
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the defendant a~pealed. The court stated: 
... [A] witness who observed the 
moving object in question will be 
permitted to estiniate its speed if 
he oossesses some knowledge or 
experience, however slight, which 
will enable him to form an opinion. 
The qualification of the witness to 
judge accurately goes to the weight 
which the jury may give his testimony 
rather than to its competency. 452 
P.2d at 976. 
The holdings of the cases cited above follow the reasoning of 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Evidence: 
(1) If the witness is not testifying 
as an expert his testimony in the form 
of opinions or inferences is limited 
to such opinions or inferences as the 
judge finds (a) may be rationally 
based on the perception of the witness 
and (b) are helpful to a clear under-
standing of his testimony or to the 
determination of the fact in issue. 
* * * 
(4) Testimonv in the form of opinions 
or inferences-otherwise admissible 
under these rules is not objectionable 
because it embraces the ultimate issue 
or issues to be decided by the trier 
of the fact. 
Mr. Bell possessed experience with moving vehicles in 
the vicinity of the collision of the defendants' vehicles in 
this case. He is of reasonable intelligence and actually 
observ<"d the vehicles in question. He was qualified to give 
opinion testimony as to the speed of the vehicles at the time 
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of the accident. His opinion is based on his perception o:: 
incident, and it is helpful to the determination of the issu' 
of defendant-respondent's negligence. 
follows: 
Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides as 
A verdict or finding shall not be 
set aside, nor shall the judgment 
or decision based thereon be reversed, 
by reason of the erroneous exclusion 
of evidence unless (a) it appears of 
record that the proponent of the evi-
dence either made known the substance 
of the evidence in a form and by a 
method approved by the judge, or 
indicated the substance of the expected 
evidence by questions indicating the 
desired answers, and (b) the court which 
passes upon the effect of the error 
or errors is of the opinion that the 
excluded evidence would probably have 
had a substantial influence in bringing 
about a different verdict or finding. 
Plaintiff-appellant indicated the substance of the 
expected evidence of the speed defendants were traveling at 
the time of the accident by questions indicating the desired 
answers (T. 95). The excluded evidence of the defendants' 
speed at the time of the accident would have a substantial 
influence in bringing about a denial of defendant-responden:' 
directed verdict motion, and was crucial to plaintiff-appefr 
case. The trial court should have allowed testimony of the 
speed of defendants' vehicles at the time of their collisioi, 
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Fai lure to allow the evidence of speed is prejudicial and 
reversible error. 
Point 2. The evidence is sufficient to support a 
finding that defendant-respondent Heirnberg was negligent. 
A. Evidence of Racing 
Witnesses who observed the defendants' vehicles 
immediately prior to the collision gave direct testimony that 
th<" vehicles were racing or otherwise traveling at a high rate 
of spRed (T. 96, 100). Their engine sounds were louder than 
engine sounds of other vehicles (T. 94), and the trucks were 
going faster than most other cars which drive down Victory Road 
(T. 101). 
Also, the defendant-respondent Heimberg himself testi-
fied of facts from which a jury could infer that the vehicles 
were racing or involved in a chase or high-speed pursuit at the 
time of the accident. A few minutes prior to the accident the 
Leyba vehicle's occupants yelled at the Heirnberg vehicle and 
revved their engine as though they wanted to race (T. 123). 
Firecrackers were thrown by at least one occupant of the Heirnberg 
vehicle (T. 145). There had been, by analogy, an "offer" and 
"acceptance" of some form of confrontation. The confrontation 
or joint activity continued as the Leyba vehicle raced up State 
Street towards the Capitol. This "cat and mouse" game did not 
terminate when Leyba turned right and Heimberg turned left on 
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Third North Street. Once the joint activity had begun, it 
could only terminate upon mutual agreement. 
The joint activity continued on Columbia Street, wh., 
Leyba stopped his truck in front of Heimberg' s truck (T. l4i 
Heimberg could perhaps have avoided further contact with the 
Leyba vehicle, but chose to stop his truck behind the Ley'1a 
vehicle. At that point a fight broke out between occuoants 
the vehicles, and a passenger of the Heimberg vehicle knocke. 
down and kicked a passenger of the Leyba vehicle (T. 147, JJ 
Heimberg then let the passenger who had been involved in th1 
fight back into his vehicle and he left the scene of the fiq 
with the Leyba vehicle behind him (T. 148, 149). ~1oments lr 
the vehicles collided while, according to the testimony of 
witnesses, they appeared to be racing (T. 9 6, 100, 14 8, 149! 
B. Racing as a Violation of a 
Statutory Duty of Care 
Racing an automobile on the public highways in the 
State of Utah is a viola ti on of the statutory duty of care ' 
forth in Section 41-6-51 (a), Utah Code Annotated (1953, as 
amended): 
No person shall engage in any 
motor vehicle speed contest or exhi-
bition of speed on a highway . 
The comparable Salt Lake City Ordinance is § 41-6-119: 
No person shall engage in any 
vehicle speed contest or exhibition, 
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or in any vehicle acceleration contest 
or exhibition on any street or alley. 
C. Racing as Negligence 
Other jurisdictions, and early Utah cases cited in 
Thompson vs. Ford Motor Companv, 16 Utah 2d 30, 365 P.2d 62 
(1964), in examininq the violation of a duty of care fixed by 
law or ordinance where the law or ordinance is instituted for 
the safety of life, limb, or property, have gone so far as to 
hold that violation of such duty is negligence as a matter of 
law. 
In Newcomb vs. Cassidy, 245 N.E.2d 846 (Ind. App. 1969), 
the guardian of a minor brought an action against allegedly 
racing automobile drivers to recover for injuries sustained by 
the minor when the vehicle in which the minor was a passenger 
was involved in an accident. When the trial court granted 
summary judgment for both defendants, plaintiff appealed. 
The Appellate Court of Indiana, in reversing the trial 
court's decision, held that a genuine issue of material fact 
existed, i.e., whether there was a race or speed contest, and 
stated, 
The racing of motor vehicles on a public 
highway is negligence and the drivers 
who engage in speed contests are each 
liable for injuries to third persons 
regardless of which of the racing vehicles 
actually inflicted the injury and even 
though there is no contact between the 
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racing vehicles. 245 N.E.2d at 851. 
Racing motor vehicles on a public highway has also: 
held to be negligence per se in Jonas vs. Peterson, 279 Minn. 
241, 156 N.W.2d 773 (1968), where, following a fatal accident 
during a race on a public highway, the trustee for the: n~xt: 
kin brought a wrongful death action against the driver oft;,; 
vehicle in which the decedent was riding and against the drr. 
of the other vehicle. Upon judgment for the: plaintiff, the 
defendants appeale:d. The Supreme Court of Minnesota affirn~c 
the trial court's decision, stating: 
We agree with the trial judge that 
this [preceding at a high rate of 
speed and apparently racing] con-
stitutes negligence as a matter of 
law and we find nothing . . . cited 
by defendants . • • requiring us to 
hold otherwise. 156 N.W.2d at 737. 
The leading case in the State of Utah on the matter 
of whether the violation of a statutory duty of care is negL 
gence as a matter of law is Thompson vs. Ford Motor Companv, 
supra. In Thompson the plaintiff sued to recover for injuri' 
received when a parked garbage truck of which he was in char~· 
suddenly gave way, throwing him to the ground. The trial CO'-
he ld that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a ma: 
of law for violating the "unattended vehicle" statute, § 41·;. 
Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended), and granted the defer· 
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dant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff appealed. 
The Utah Supreme Court examined Utah common law on 
the issue of statute violation as evidence of negligence, and 
held that violation of a standard of safety set by statute or 
ordinance is to be regarded as prima facie evidence of negli-
gence, but is subject to justification or excuse. 16 Utah 2d 
at 33, 34. The matter was remanded to the trial court for a 
presentation of the disputed issues. 
In the case at bar, defendant-respondent Heimberg 
gave no justification or excuse for his participation in a 
race, chase or high-speed pursuit in which he was engaged at 
the time of the accident. 
D. Abandonment of Race by One Party Does 
Not Terminate Liability 
In the case of Lemons vs. Kellv, 239 Ore. 354, 397 
P.2d 784 (1964), a passenger injured when the car in which she 
was riding was involved in an accident, sued her driver and the 
driver of the other vehicle involved. The jury concluded that 
the defendants were racing at the time of the accident, and 
that the racing was the cause of the accident and plaintiff's 
injuries. From a verdict for plaintiff, the defendants appealed 
on the grounds that the race had terminated by the time of the 
accident. 
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The Supreme Court of Oregon stated the general r:.;:; 
"There can be no doubt that liability 
for injury to a third person is imposed 
upon all participants in an automobile 
race even though only one vehicle is 
actually involved in an accident." 
397 P.2d at 785. 
With regards to the alleged termination of the rac2 
by defendants, the court stated: 
It is said in all of the authorities 
cited that racing on a highway is hazardous 
to all other persons upon the highway and 
that the actor participates at his peril 
•..• One who does participate in setting 
in motion such hazardous conduct cannot 
thereafter turn his liability off like a 
light switch. From the authorities cited 
we conclude that one who participates in 
setting such hazardous conduct in motion 
cannot later be heard to say: "Oh! I 
withdrew before harm resulted even though 
no one else was aware of my withdrawal." 
It would be a reasonable probability that 
the excitement and stimulus created by 
this race of several miles had not dissipated 
nor, in fact, terminated at all, in the 
fraction of a minute in time beuveen the 
act of passing and the accident. The 
state of mind of the participants was material. 
We cannot gauge that state of mind to the 
point of saying that the stimulus or intent 
had ended. The evidence warrants a finding 
that it did continue. It would be for the 
jury to decide if the racing were the cause 
of the accident. 397 P. 2d at 787. (Cita-
tions omitted.) 
The Lemon court held that all participants in a race are c1v: 
liable for injuries to a third person which results from t.~i 
race. 
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Plaintiff 's evidence of defendant-respondent Heirnberg's 
racing by witnesses who actually saw the vehicles immediately 
prior to the accident (T. 96, 100, 101) , and who heard the loud 
engine noises of the respective vehicles (T. 94), and evidence 
of "fooling around" and a fight just before the accident (T. 146 
to 150), is evidence from which the jury could conclude that 
Heirnberg was participating in a race, chase or high-speed pursuit 
without cause or justification and was negligent in operating 
his vehicle at the time of the accident. 
Poin~ 3. The evidence is sufficient to support a 
finding that defendant-respondent Heimberg's negligence was 
the proximate cause of plaintiff-appellant's damages. 
A. Definition of "Proximate Cause" 
This court has defined "proximate cause" of an injury 
in Cox vs. Thompson, 123 Utah 81, 254 P. 2d 1047 (1953) as "the 
primary moving cause without which it would not have been 
inflicted, but which, in the natural and probable sequence of 
events, and without the intervention of any new or independent 
cause, produces the injury." 123 Utah at 89, 90. 
There can be more than one proximate cause. In Hillyard 
vs. Utah Bv-Products co., l Utah 2d 143, 263 P.2d 287 (1953), an 
action to recover for wrongful death to a passenger of a vehicle 
which struck an improperly parked truck, this court stated: 
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It has frequently been recognized that 
more than one separate act of negligence, 
even though they do not happen simul taneouslv, 
may be proximate causes of an injury. 1 Utah 
2d at 147. 
The court in this landmark decision went on to say: 
One is guilty of negligence when he does 
such an act or omits to take such a 
precaution that under the circumstances 
present, as an ordinary prudent person, 
he ought reasonably to foresee that he 
will thereby expose the interests of 
another to an unreasonable risk of 
harm. When one does so he may be held 
liable for any resulting injuries 
caused by any reasonably foreseeable 
conduct whether it be innocent, negli-
gent, or even criminal. Hillyard, ~ 
at 147. 
B. Test of Foreseeability 
The test of liability is not whether the defendant 
could have foreseen the precise form in which the injury ace·. 
resulted, but whether the damage or injury appears to have c· 
a natural and probable consequence of his act. If the act:' 
one which he could have anticipated as likely to result in 
injury, although he could not have anticipated the part1cuk 
injury which did occur, liability would attach. Hillyard,~ 
at 148. 
"The • . test", stated this court in Watters vs. 
Querry, 588 P.2d 702 (Utah, 1978), "is whether under the pa:· 
cular circumstances [the defendant] should have foreseen tha: 
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his conduct would have exposed others to an unreasonable risk 
of harm; and this includes situations where negligent or other 
wrongful conduct of others should reasonably be anticipated." 
588 P.2d at 704. 
Racing in pickup trucks at night is an activity in 
which the likelihood of a serious injury is great. With auto-
mobile racing, as the public has been well-educated, lives are 
at stake, and serious property damage may occur. To the 
reasonable and prudent man, serious damage and injury is readily 
foreseeable. 
In a race or chase, especially after an exchange of 
words and a fight as happened in this case (T. 145, 147, 148), 
a reasonable and prudent man would be on notice of the other 
driver's probable negligence or other irrational or criminal 
act. 
C. Heirnberg as the Cause-in-Fact 
Heirnberg's participation in the negligent act of racing 
was the cause-in-fact of plaintiff's damage. His vehicle 
smashed into plaintiff's service station and set it on fire in 
a literal cause-and-effect sense (T. 97, 98, 150). 
The cause-in-fact relationship between plaintiff's 
damagf'>s and Heirnberg' s wrongful conduct is the proximate cause 
of plaintiff's damages. Participation by Heirnberg in the race, 
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chase or high-speed pursuit was the primary moving cause o: 
damages. But for that participation, the accident would no-
have happened and plaintiff-appellant's service station~~ 
have been damaged. The accident was in the natural and pre: 
sequence of events and a reasonable and prudent man should' 
foreseen that a traffic accident could occur as a result o'. 
Heirnberg's actions. 
A reasonable man in Heimberg' s circumstances, espec. 
after the fight at the top of the hill (T. 147, 148), wocld 
avoided the risk by slowing down to a safe speed, by avoid1:. 
the "goofing off" which occurred while driving or riding in 
automobiles, by turning from potential conflicts rather thar. 
stopping to participate or to allow fellow passengers to par 
cipate, or by taking other reasonable action. But Heirnberg 
not willing to make the small sacrifice to avoid the risk o: 
great harm and injury and he continued in the confrontation 
until the time the accident occured. 
D. Leyba's Negligence Not an Independent, 
Intervening Act 
The collision with the Heirnberg vehicle by the Leyt 
vehicle (T. 149, 150) was not an independent intervening ca': 
which superseded the negligence of Heimberg, thereby insula'.: 
Heirnberg' s negligence from being a substantial factor in cac 
the collision with plaintiff's service station and relievinc 
Heirnberg from liability. Heimberg should have realized thac 
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the Leyba vehicle could have been involved in an accident with 
the Heimberg vehicle or with third parties during the course 
of the race or chase. A reasonable man knowing the situation 
would not regard the collision between the two vehicles as 
highly extraordinary, and the purported intervening act is a 
normal response to the race or chase in which Heimberg parti-
cipated. 
The defendant who owned the parked truck in Hillyard, 
supra, argued as a matter of law that the negligence of the 
driver of the vehicle in which the plaintiff was riding was 
an intervening act which superseded the negligence in parking 
the truck, thereby insulating that negligence from being a 
substantial factor in causing the collision. In addressing this 
argument the court said: 
The Restatement of the Law of Torts 
essentially expressed the same concept in 
a different manner: 
"The fact that an intervening 
act of a third person is negligent 
in itself or is done in a negligent 
manner does not make it a superseding 
cause of harm to another which the 
actor's negligent conduct is a sub-
stantial factor in bringing about, if: 
" (a) The actor at the time 
of his negligent conduct should have 
realized that a third person might so 
act, or 
" (b) A reasonable man knowing 
the situation existing when the act of 
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the third person was done would not 
regard it as highly extraordinary that 
the third person had so acted, or 
" (c) The intervening act is 
a normal response to a situation created 
by the actor's conduct and the manner in 
which it is done is not extraordinarily 
negligent." 
The doctrine enunciated in the above 
quotations is based upon the proposition 
that one cannot excuse himself from liability 
arising from his negligent acts merely 
because the later negligence of another 
concurs to cause an injury, if the later 
act was a legally foreseeable event. 
This is true particularly where, in retrospect, the interve::. 
act did not appear to be particularly unusual or extraorclin1 
1 Utah 2d at 149 (footnotes omitted); quoted with approval; 
Jensen vs. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Comnanv, 
611 P.2d 363 (Utah, 1980). 
E. Piaintiff-Appellant May Sue Either Defendant 
Plaintiff-appellant may sue either defendant, or be 
of them, and it may recover judgments against one or both oi 
them. This court in Dawson vs. Board of Education of Weber 
County School District, 118 Utah 452, 222 P.2d 590 (1950), • 
action to recover for the wrongful death of a minor child fir 
by a defendant as the child alighted from a school bus ownec 
by the defendant school district, stated the widely recognlZ' 
rule that having a single cause of action against more thane 
tort feasor, an injured party may proceed against the wrongc 
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either jointly or severally and he may recover judgment or 
judgments against one or all. 118 Utah at 456. 
When two parties are jointly charged with negligence, 
it is only necessary to show that both contributed to the 
injury, notwithstanding the fact that one may have been wanton 
and reckless, and the other simply manifested want of ordinary 
caution. Blackwell vs. American Film Co., 48 Cal. App. 681, 
192 P. 189 (1920). Blackwell is an action for personal injuries 
arising from a head-on collision between two automobiles owned 
by the defendants. The court stated: 
Although the act of each defendant 
alone might not have caused the injury, 
there is no good reason why each defen-
dant should not be liable for the 
damage caused by the different acts 
of all. 192 P.2d at 190. 
See also Annotation: Joint Liability for Injury to Third Person 
for Damage to His Property Due to Concurring Negligence of 
Drivers of Automobiles, 62 ALR 1425 (1929). 
Both Heimberg and Leyba contributed to the injury of 
plaintiff-appellant by participating in the mutual activity of 
racing or chasing (T. 96, 100, 101). Even if Leyba intentionally 
rammed his truck into Heimberg's vehicle, Heimberg would not be 
relieved of liability because of his participation in the negli-
gent act. 
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Point 4. The trial court in granting a directed.,., 
for defPndant-respondent Heimberg irnproperlv refused to sue· 
issues of his negligence and the proximate cause of th"' pl;. 
appellant's damages to the jurv. 
The directed verdict law in the State of Utah is 5. 
forth in the recent Supreme Court case, Kirn vs. Anderson,>. 
P.2d 1270 (Utah 1980). Kirn vs. Anderson was a malpractice: 
wherein the plaintiff alleged the defendant negligently drc: 
a drill bit down the plaintiff's throat during a root cana: 
operation. When the trial court granted defendant's rnotior. 
a directed verdict for failure to present expert testimony: 
to the required standard of care and the viola ti on thereof, 
plaintiff appealed to this court. 
This court vacated the order and remanded for fur::. 
proceedings, holding that expert testirrony was not required 
under the facts of the case, and further stated: 
In directing a verdict, the trial court 
should examine the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the party against whom 
the motion is made. On appeal, we view 
the evidence in the same manner and if 
there is a reasonable basis therein, and 
the inferences which may be drawn therefrom, 
which would support a judgment in favor of 
the losing party below, a judgment based on 
a directed verdict cannot be sustained. 
(610 P.2d at 1271; footnotes omitted.) 
This court has further stated in the matter of 
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Boskovich vs. Utah Construction Company, 123 Utah 387, 259 P. 2d 
885 (1953), an action to recover for a balance alleged to be 
due under an alleged oral guarantee of payment for use of 
plaintiff's pa tended machine, that "the court must consider 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against 
whom the motion is directed and must resolve every controverted 
fact in his favor." 123 Utah at 390. 
From a verdict and judgment in favor of plaintiff 
after defendant's motion for a directed verdict was denied in 
an action for personal injuries when a father attempted to 
rescue his minor son from a dangerous situation in defendant's 
railroad yard, the defendant appealed. This court in affirming 
the trial court's decision stated that the non-moving party's 
evidence must be taken as true and every legitimate inference 
drawn in its favor. Christensen vs. Los Angeles and S.L.R. Co., 
77 Utah 85, 90, 291 P. 926 (1930). 
This court has also held that it is not the province 
of the trial court to weigh or determine the preponderance of 
the evidence in Finlayson vs. Brady, 121 Utah 204, 240 P.2d 491 
(1952), an action for damages for the price of defective gas 
heaters and for loss of rentals where defendants counterclaimed 
for the balance due under a conditional sales contract for the 
purchase of the heaters. The trial court directed a verdict 
for defendant on plaintiff's complaint and awarded a rroney judg-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-24-
rnent on defendant's counterclaim. The Supreme Court on apPE 
found substantial contradictory evidence on both sides whic:. 
required giving the case to the jury, reversed the trial co. 
order, and remanded for a new trial. 
If, in granting defendant-respondent's motion for; 
directed verdict, the trial court considered Heimberg' s tes: 
mony that he drove away from the scene of the fight at a no:: 
speed (T. 153), thereby inferring that the confrontations 
between the defendants had terminated, then the court irnproc; 
weighed the preponderance of the evidence. The issues of 
Heimberg's negligence and its being the ·proximate cause of 
plaintiff-appellant's damages should have been given to the 
jury and Heirnberg's directed verdict motion denied. 
App lying the Kirn vs. Anderson rule cited above at p; 
22, the trial court in the present case improperly granted a 
directed verdict to defendant-respondent He irnberg. Plaintif'. 
appellant produced competent, uncontroverted evidence of 
Heirnberg's racing (T. 96, 100, 101), and further evidence 
(T. 94, 118 to 121, 123, 145 to 150) from which a jury could 
reasonably infer that Heirnberg and Leyba were involved in a 
race or chase or other high-speed pursuit during which the1: 
respective vehicles collided, sending Heimberg' s vehicle eras· 
into the Little America Service Station. Such evidence, if 
taken as true, and in a light most favorable to plaintiff-ac: 
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is sufficient to support a judgment for plaintiff-appellant. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court should have allowed testimony con-
cerning the speed of the defendants' vehicles at the time of 
the accident. Refusal to admit such testimony is reversible 
error. 
Plaintiff-appellant produced competent evidence that 
defendant-respondent Heimberg was involved in a race or chase 
on a public highway at the time of the accident in this case. 
Additional competent evidence was produced from which the jury 
could infer that the defendants were racing or chasing each 
other at the time of the accident. Such a course of action 
would create a dangerous situation in which a reasonable and 
prudent person could easily foresee that a third party could 
be injured or damaged. 
Defendant-respondent's negligent conduct, without which 
the damages to plaintiff-appellant's service station would not 
have occurred, was a proximate cause of said damages. 
Taking all of plaintiff-appellant's evidence as true, 
the trial court should not have granted the motion for directed 
verdict. The issues of negligence and proximate cause should 
have been given to the jury and the directed verdict motion 
denied. To allow Heimberg to be free from liability under the 
facts of this case would encourage racing on public highways 
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and create imminent hazards to other users of the public hi~ 
ways and to those whose property adjoins the highways. 
The trial court's Order Directing Verdict for Defen 
Sven Heimberg should be reversed and the case remanded fora 
new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICHARDS, BIRD & KUMP 
Johnson 
s for Plaintiff-Appel' 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the 3rd day of December, i! 
I delivered two copies of the foregoing Plaintiff-Appellant'; 
Brief, to Frank N. Karras, attorney for defendant-respcndent, 
Z,Z/ 
at 3'f South Sixth East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
